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Daniel Kselman
Daniel Kselman is Vice Dean at the IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs. He received a PhD in political science from Duke University, where he also received a Masters degree in Economics. His research focuses on political parties, electoral systems, and strategic voting, and employs a mix of formal theoretic modeling and empirical analysis. Daniel’s research has been published in top academic journals including Political Analysis, Comparative Political Studies, and Political Science Research and Methods. He also is former President of the Minga Foundation, an international NGO in the field of health and economic development with projects in Brazil, Ecuador, Malawi, and Uganda.
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE
• Vice Dean IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs, January 2016 – Present
• Assistant Professor, IE University, 2013 – Present
• Academic Director, IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs, 2013 – 2016
• Research Fellow, Juan March Institute, 2010 – 2013
ACADEMIC BACKGROUND
• PhD in Political Science and Government, Duke University, 2001 – 2009
• BS in Political Science and Government, Indiana University Bloomington, 1995 – 2000
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
• Kselman, D. (2020). “Public goods equilibria under closed and open-list proportional representation”. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 32 (1): 112-142
• Kselman, D., Niou, E., Wang, A.H-E. (2020). “Measuring ‘Closeness’ in 3-Candidate Elections: Methodology and an Application to Strategic Voting”. Electoral Studies, Vol. 68
• Kselman, D., Eleanor Neff Powell, Joshua A. Tucker. (2016). “Crowded Space, Fertile Ground: Party and Entry and the Effective Number of Parties”. Political Science Research and Methods, Vol. 4 (2): 317-342
• Kselman, D., Herbert Kitschelt. (2013). “Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties’ Linkage Strategies.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46 (11): 1453-1484
• Kselman, D., Emerson Niou. (2011). “Protest Voting in Plurality Elections: a Theory of Electoral Signaling”. Public Choice, Vol. 148 (3-4): 395-418